God has recognized man to be qualified for attaining a perfectional form of the rational soul due to his piety and balanced constitution. This soul, which is a spiritual faculty, enables man to have universal and particular perceptions and influence meanings and forms.This rational soul has two faculties. He perceives the universals with one of them and act upon his ideas with the other. The former is called theoretical intellect. According to the common Peripatetic theory, universal knowledge is attained through connection to the Active intellect, which contains all universal perceptual forms. In this way, in order to perceive the universals, the soul turns to its superior world, i.e., the world of separate intelligences. The faculty by which the rational soul becomes involved in though-related activities is called the practical intellect. Such activities are performed through developing particular ideas concerning practical affairs.

Philosophers view the advantage of human soul over animal soul in theoretical and practical intellect. However, there is disagreement among them in stating the quiddity of these two intellects. With a deliberation on their words, at least four interpretations can be implied from these two intellects. After reporting the statements and expressing the functions of practical intellect, the article goes on to evaluate and explain the selected theory. The generally accepted view among the later scholars is that there is no more than one intellect in human soul, which understands all the general sciences and rulings. However, since some of these sciences are merely theoretical and dedicated to external and noumenal realities, they are called theoretical intellects. In this interpretation the distinction of the two intellects from one another is nominal and is in their objects of perceptions (mudrakat). As maintained in the article, despite its popularity, this interpretation is not of interest to the distinguished philosophers and is facing various problems. But other statements, with slight tolerance, can be referred to a single comprehensive interpretation; i.e. The first and essential act of practical intellect is to infer partial practical rulings from general rulings of theoretical intellect, and since these rulings in the sovereignty of intellect over physical faculties cause the appearance of will in the soul for issuance of voluntary acts and human fabrications, the practical intellect is also called “practical faculty”.

Man as the noblest of all creatures, contains rational soul and the soul contains two faculties of theoretical and practical. Rational faculties is called theoretical intellect viewing the relation of soul and active intellect and practical faculty is called practical intellect viewing the relation of soul and body. But among Islamic philosophers there is not a unique interpretation and commentary on practical and theoretical intellect. In this article, we first try to consider the word "intellect" semantically, and then study Ibn-Sina's view on the ranks of practical intellect and theoretical intellect and their functions and the different philosophic viewpoints on these two faculties.

This paper aims to indicate the relation of gender and practical intellect based on Avicenna’s philosophical principles. Different definitions and aspects of practical intellect, along with the definitions of gender and their submission to the rules and problems of Avicenna’s Philosophy, would be regarded as the extention of Sinavi wisdom in the issue of gender. To achieve this purpose the analytical method has been applied and following aspects evaluated: 1. Relation of gender and practical intellect based on principles regarding practical intellect as director of willing deed; 2.  Cooperative states of soul and body in terms of gender and practical intellect 3. The relationship between soul and its faculties and the role of gender in it 4. The process of the formation of behavior with reference to gender 5. Gender and the factors of the perfection of practical intellect 6. Inferring relation of gender and practical intellect as perceptive faculty 7. Gender and knowledge related to practical intellect spatially Ethics. Studies show the influence of gender not in a general and absolute way, but in a partial and conditional way on different fields of practical intellect.

In Avicenna’ s view, the practical intellect plays a basic and foundational role in producing moral action. By investigating this notion in the framework of Avicenna’ s philosophy, we find that he regards perception and cognition as the main functions of the practical intellect. However, he considers this perception as particular, introducing it as different from the particularity of imaginary and estimative cognitions (animal perceptive faculties). This difference makes the action produced by an animal essentially different from the action produced by the practical intellect. This view, however, is contrary to the views of some other philosophers and theologians who disagree with him on the perceptive function of the practical intellect and maintain just a motivational function for it. In addition, Avicenna enumerates the following as other roles of the practical intellect in producing moral action: motivational and incentive function; dominance over motivational and inclinative (to or against) faculties, etc and being served by them; serving the speculative intellect and purifying, completing and refining the speculative intellect in the realm of the practical intellect. Many other points have also been mentioned in this regard within this article. Overall, the central role of the practical intellect in producing moral action in Avicenna’ s view gives rise to other discussions regarding moral action as well, in a way that those discussions are based on, or lead to it directly or indirectly.

The Explanation of the De Anima of Aristotle is the most important issue for Scholastic Philosophers. Averroes as the Commentator of Aristotle, explains De Anima of Aristotle in three works: Short Commentary, Middle Commentary and Long Commentary on de Anima. The latter contains the latest and most perfect of Averroes view about material intellect. He is trying to present a coherent explain about human knowledge that is vague in Aristotle philosophy. For Averroes this faculty must be the identical receptive of external forms and before its thinking, not anyone of them. According to Averroes this intellect is one and shared for all, thae is, Material intellect provides the one and shared knowledge for men. In this article we will investigate the point of Averroes in his explanations of Aristotle, particularly in Long Commentary on de anima.

The necessity of moving from derived propositions to basic ones and distinguishing them in the two fields of theoretical and practical intellect has been the subject of study since antiquity. Shahid Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr (1934-1980), using the theological tradition and principles of his predecessors, made an appraisal of the different aspects of practical intellect which led to various innovations in the field, one of which, as the focus of the present study, is the basis of practical intellect propositions. Using a descriptive-analytic method, the present study demonstrates that Shahid Sadr does not approve of turning back from practical intellect propositions to the two propositions of "good nature of justice" and "ugliness of oppression". He believes that these two propositions are analytical and attributable to the issue of the right and authority of the master. Relying on the truth value of practical intellect propositions, Shahid Sadr considers their basis to be "the right of obedience" and considers it as the basis of the inherent devotion of the true master, including all possible ethical duties. This theory has some shortcomings that are being addressed in the present study. The innovation of the present study, on the one hand, is the inference and interpretation made of Shahid Sadr's point of view, and on the other hand, is the evaluation and explanation of its strengths and weaknesses.

One of the important discussions in the history of theology in Islamic and western culture has been whether intellect can solve all of the problems of human beings or not? Mulla Sadra, the inheritor of peripatetic and oriental philosophy and Islamic Gnosticism and the establisher of transcendent philosophy, regards intellect as a powerful instrument for resolving difficulties of many humanistic and divine problems; but he didn’t neglect its limits.According to his works such asAsfar, Mafatih-al-Ghueib, Illumination of Kafi's Principles, Shavahed-al-Robubiah, Three Principles' Treatise, and etc., the writer thinks that Mulla Sadra believes in limits of intellect in different cases like, soul, names and attributes of God, mysteries and secrets of existence world, the facts of existence world, the corporal Return; also most of the scholars believe that he regarded intellect and faith complimentary. In this essay we try to study these issues.

Active intellect" in Ibn Bajjah's Philosophy is important in epistemology, ethics and human happiness. Therefore, the topic of "active intellect" is discussed in different ways. "Truth of active reason" in the epistemological and existential position, regardless of its importance for the purpose and happiness of man, is the present issue of this article. the question is, what is the existential and epistemological place of active intellect in Ibn Bajjah's theory of intellect. Is it in the human person and related to the soul, or is it in the higher world and something separate from humans? Is it one or plural? Ibn Bajjah assign to the active intellect has the epistemological position of imparting knowledge and forms to the intellects of Human and imaginary images to animals, and in terms of the existential position of the active intellect, his words are mixed and he speaks about the unity or plurality of the intellect in different levels of the intellect, according to the rationality of that intellect and its relationship with the matter. It considers the useful intellect and the active intellect as one. Therefore, in order to investigate this issue and answer the questions raised, we first explain the Cognitive Soul, then we discuss the levels of intellect and what is the active intellect in Ibn Bajjah. And finally, we will analyze and review the said content. The article is written with a descriptive-analytical method

Avicenna’, s practical philosophy, unlike his theoretical philosophy, did not gain intellectual power in Islamic philosophical tradition. An investigation into the absence of the human action problem at the center of Avicennan thought could explain both the origin of the theory/practice separation in Avicenna and the subsequent philosophical tradition in the Islamic world, which is based on Avicennan thought. While researchers have considered this problem from non-philosophical perspectives, the present paper concentrates on its philosophical origins in the Avicennan thought and explores his conception of practical philosophy in his discussion about the division of sciences. The finding is that the theoretical and practical philosophies are common in theorization and differ in their practical ends. Thus both the theoretical and practical philosophies are theories, but the theoretical one is a pure theory, and the practical one is a second-order theory. Because of the sovereignty of the theoretical over the practical, practical philosophy also aims to theorize the action. But changeable, individual, and manifold qualities of practice are not understood by the unchangeable, universal, and uniform attributes of theory. As an adherent to the priority and dominance of the theoretical, Avicenna tried to theorize action as much as possible (by the action theory in psychology) and entrusted the rest of it, which was not recognizable by theoretical reason, to another authority, that is religion. Thus in Avicennan encounter with humanitarian action, eventually, the practice would not be an original philosophical problem to necessitate a practical philosophy.